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VIOLENTLY POSSESSED: JOHNSON
AS THE VEHICLE FOR LIMITING
SENTENCING ENHANCEMENT
UNDER THE ARMED CAREER
CRIMINALS ACT
JONATHAN ROBE
INTRODUCTION
As a curative measure for indeterminacy in sentencing,
legislatures, and particularly the United States Congress, have often
imposed mandatory minimum sentencing, including sentence
1
enhancement, for certain crimes. At the federal level these sentencing
regimes date back to the early days of the republic but have only
2
gained significant attention over the past several decades. There are
currently nearly two-hundred federal offenses that come with
mandatory minimum prison sentences (many of them added in the
3
past couple of decades), though not all are enforced to the same
4
degree. And many academics and practitioners have challenged the
5
efficacy of such regimes. Criticism of mandatory minimum sentencing
6
regimes has become increasingly widespread. For example, Justice
Breyer, who served previously as United States Sentencing

 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2016.
1. See, e.g., SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES
AND MATERIALS 1167 (9th ed. 2012).
2. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
199, 200 (1993).
3. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 72 (2011).
4. See Schulhofer, supra note 2, at 201.
5. See, e.g., id. at 220–21 (concluding that mandatory minimums often lead to excessive
punishment without eliminating uncertainty, create the potential for abuse, and lower
accountability in sentencing).
6. See Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1
(2010) (noting that the belief that mandatory minimums “depriv[e] judges of the flexibility to
tailor punishment . . . and can result in an unduly harsh sentence” has spread beyond the
judiciary to the political branches).
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Commissioner, has argued that statutory mandatory minimum
sentencing hampers the determination of appropriate sentences and
allows prosecutors to subvert the judicial role in the sentencing
7
8
proces. This view has also gained currency with the general public.
The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) of 1984 is an example
of statutorily defined mandatory minimum sentences, imposing
sentencing enhancements for firearm offenses committed by persons
9
with a prior history of violent crime. The ACCA allows for sentencing
enhancement if a defendant has prior convictions meeting the
10
statute’s definition of a “violent felony.” Importantly, the ACCA
contains a so-called “residual clause” providing that a prior conviction
counts as a violent felony for purposes of sentencing enhancement if
it “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
11
physical injury to another.”
As the Supreme Court found in 1990, the principal aim of the
ACCA is to “supplement the States’ law enforcement efforts against
12
‘career’ criminals.” The legislative rationale was that particular care
needed to be taken with regard to repeat offenders, given evidence
that such offenders were responsible for a “large percentage” of
13
violent crimes. The legislature’s motivation was to “incapacitate”
14
such criminals.
15
Because of the complexity (or perhaps the opacity) of the
ACCA’s residual clause, it has been the subject of a remarkable
16
amount of litigation in the federal courts. There is currently a circuit
17
split over the question presented in Johnson v. United States, namely

7. Hon. Stephen Breyer, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Revisited, 11 FED. SENT’G REP.
180 (1999).
8. See, e.g., Leon Neyfakh, Can juries tame prosecutors gone wild?, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb.
3, 2013, http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2013/02/03/can-juries-tame-prosecutors-gone-wildcan-juries-tame-prosecutors-gone-wild/yAvVOZPmpm408lskfiMe3M/story.html.
9. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e) (West 2014).
10. The three definitions of violent felony are discussed infra Part III.
11. 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
12. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 581 (1990).
13. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 1 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3661.
14. Id. at 2.
15. See Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2284 (2011) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (Justice
Scalia has termed it the “Delphic residual clause”).
16. See United States v. Miller, 721 F.3d 435, 437 (7th Cir. 2013) (remarking that
“[p]erhaps no single statutory clause has ever received more frequent Supreme Court attention
in such a short period of time or such a proliferation of lower court reaction”).
17. No. 13-7120 (U.S. argued Nov. 5, 2014).
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whether mere possession of a short-barreled shotgun is a violent
18
felony under the ACCA. Four circuits answer in the negative and
19
two in the affirmative. Thus, Johnson presents the Court not only an
opportunity to resolve a circuit split but also to provide much needed
clarity to its jurisprudence regarding the ACCA residual clause.
This commentary details the relevant facts and procedural history,
including the Eighth Circuit’s holding below, and overviews current
ACCA residual clause jurisprudence. It then lays out the arguments
advanced by both parties and analyzes these arguments in light of the
governing law, concluding that the Court should reverse the Eighth
Circuit and resolve the existing circuit split by interpreting the
residual clause of the ACCA so as not to encompass mere possession
offenses. This commentary offers a way for the Court to structure its
holding narrowly to cover constructive possession cases only. Doing
so will still allow application of ACCA sentence enhancements when
appropriate.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The issue in Johnson v. United States centers squarely upon the
ACCA residual clause: whether mere possession of short-barreled
shotgun constitutes “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
20
physical injury to another.” From 2010 to 2012, the FBI investigated
the Petitioner, Samuel Johnson, in connection with his involvement in
21
several illicit activities. During the investigation, Johnson divulged to
undercover federal agents that he had manufactured explosives and
displayed both an AK-47 assault rifle and a cache of ammunition in
22
excess of one thousand rounds. Later, Johnson was found in
possession of several semi-automatic firearms; when arrested in April
2012, he admitted to possessing an AK-47 rifle and a .22 caliber semi23
automatic rifle.

18. See Brief for Petitioner at 42–47, Johnson v. United States, No. 13-7120 (U.S. Jun. 26,
2014) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
19. The circuit split is discussed infra Part III.
20. 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (West 2014).
21. See United States v. Johnson, 526 Fed. Appx. 708, 709 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. granted 134
S. Ct. 1871 (2014).
22. Id.
23. Id.
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Subsequently, Johnson was charged with four counts of possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon and two counts of possession of
ammunition by a convicted felon, all violations of 18 U.S.C. §
24
922(g)(1). While the penalty for such offenses is ordinarily a prison
25
term not exceeding ten years, Johnson faced a potential mandatory
minimum sentence of fifteen years because he was also charged with
being an armed career criminal in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e),
26
because of his three prior violent-felony convictions.
A presentence investigation report (PSR) classified three of
Johnson’s prior convictions as “violent felonies” for purposes of
establishing the requisite number of predicate offenses under the
ACCA: a 1999 attempted simple robbery conviction; a 2007 simple
robbery conviction; and a 2007 conviction for possession of a short27
barreled shotgun during a drug sale. Over Johnson’s objection, the
district court followed the recommendation of the PSR and found
that Johnson was subject to sentence enhancement under the
28
ACCA. The basis for the third predicate offense for Johnson’s
classification as an “armed career criminal” was his conviction under a

24. See generally Indictment, United States v. Johnson, No. 12-0104 (D. Minn. April 16,
2012) [hereinafter Indictment]. The statute prohibits, in relevant part, a person “who has been
convicted in any court, of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . .
to possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(1).
25. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(a)(2) (“[W]hoever knowingly violates [§ 922(g)] . . . shall be
fined as provided in this title, imprisoned not more than ten years or both.”).
26. See generally Indictment, supra note 24. The Indictment listed Johnson’s five prior
convictions, including convictions for felony theft, attempted simple robbery, simple robbery,
possession of a short-barreled shotgun, and sale of a simulated controlled substance. Id. Under
the ACCA, a person who violates § 922(g) and who also has three prior convictions for “violent
felon[ies]” is subject to a punishment of a fine and a mandatory minimum prison sentence of
fifteen years. 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e) (defining a “violent felony” to be a “crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . [which] (i) has as an element the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson,
or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another”).
27. See Johnson, 526 Fed. Appx. at 709.
28. Id. at 710. The district court made clear that its decision to classify Johnson as an
armed career criminal, and therefore subject to an enhanced sentence, was mandated by Eighth
Circuit precedent. During the sentencing hearing, the court observed:
For whatever it’s worth, and it’s probably worth nothing, I think 180 months is too
heavy of a sentence in this case. But I take an oath to follow the law as I see it and I’ve
made my decision in that regard. But, as I say, I impose the sentence reluctantly
because I think a sentence of half that or two-thirds of that would be more than
sufficient.
Transcript of Sentence Hearing at 22, United States v. Johnson, No. 12-0104 (D. Minn. Sept. 5,
2012).
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Minnesota statute prohibiting a person from “possess[ing] . . . [a]
29
short-barreled shotgun.”
Johnson subsequently pleaded guilty to one count of being an
armed career criminal in possession of a firearm in violation of §
30
922(g)(1). Following his guilty plea, the remaining five counts were
31
dismissed, and Johnson was given a prison sentence of fifteen years.
As part of the plea agreement, Johnson agreed to his designation as
an armed career criminal, but he reserved the right to challenge the
32
application of the ACCA.
Significantly, the Eighth Circuit noted that the factual situation at
issue in Johnson is indistinguishable from that in United States v.
33
Lillard, which dealt with the constructive possession of a short
shotgun under a Nebraska statute comparable to the Minnesota
34
statute. Thus, the court held that mere possession of a short-barreled
shotgun constitutes a violent felony for purposes of sentence
35
enhancement under the ACCA. Johnson petitioned for a writ of
36
37
certiorari to the Supreme Court, granted on April 21, 2014.
Johnson’s case was argued on November 5, 2014 but the Court later
reopened the case in January 2015, requesting further briefing and
oral argument on the question of whether the ACCA is
38
unconstitutionally vague.

29. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.67(2) (West 2014). The statute provides that a violation is
punishable by a prison term of five years or a fine of not more than $10,000 or both. Id. Johnson
is only contesting the designation of this third offense as a violent felony; he is not challenging
the classification of either attempted robbery or simple robbery as violent felonies. See Brief for
Petitioner, supra note 18, at 4.
30. See Johnson, 526 Fed. Appx. at 709.
31. Id. at 710.
32. Id.
33. United States v. Lillard, 685 F.3d 773 (8th Cir. 2012), discussed infra Part II.
34. Id. at 776 n.3. The Nebraska statute in Lillard provided that “[a]ny person or persons
who shall transport or possess any machine gun, short rifle, or short shotgun commits a Class IV
felony.” NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1203(1) (West 2014).
35. Johnson, 526 Fed. Appx. at 711.
36. Brief of Petitioner in Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit at 8, Johnson v. United States, No. 13-7120 (U.S. Oct. 28, 2013).
37. Johnson v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1871 (2014) (granting certiorari).
38. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 939 (2015) (directing parties to file briefs and
rescheduling argument on the question of unconstitutional vagueness).
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Statutory Language of § 924(e)
Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), there are three distinct ways in which a
predicate offense, punishable by a prison term in excess of one year,
can constitute a violent felony for purposes of sentencing
39
enhancement. First, a crime that “has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person
40
of another” is considered a violent felony. Second, the statute
explicitly lists burglary, arson, extortion, or the use of explosives as
41
crimes meeting the definition of violent felony. Finally, under the
residual clause at issue here, any offense that “otherwise involves
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
42
another” also qualifies as a violent felony. Those persons convicted
under § 922(g) and subject to § 924(e) recieve a minimum sentence of
43
fifteen years.
B. The Supreme Court’s § 924(e) Residual Clause Jurisprudence
The Court has adopted a “categorical approach” to the residual
clause, holding that a sentencing court must “look only to the fact that
the defendant had been convicted of crimes falling within certain
44
categories, and not to the facts underlying the prior convictions.” In
applying this approach, the Court has further held that judicial
inquiry should be restricted to the “least of [the] acts” required to
45
constitute a violation of a statutory prohibition.

39. See generally 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e) (West 2014).
40. Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).
41. See id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
42. 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
43. Id. § 924(e)(1).
44. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990) (holding that a conviction for an
offense requiring proof of all elements of burglary constituted burglary under the residual
clause regardless of how the offense was labeled).
45. Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 137 (2010). A more recent case, dealing with
the Immigration and Naturalization Act rather than the ACCA, further explicated the
categorical approach given in Taylor by requiring a “focus on the minimum conduct
criminalized” under a state statute without resorting to “legal imagination.” Moncrieffe v.
Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684–85 (2013).
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In four prior cases, the Supreme Court has described this
categorical approach as a test that “consider[s] whether the elements
of the offense are of the type that would justify its inclusion within the
residual provision” by “ask[ing] whether the risk posed . . . is
comparable to that posed by its closest analog among the enumerated
46
offenses.” Risk is assessed in terms of “the possibility that an
47
innocent person might appear while the crime is in progress.” Those
offenses falling within the scope of the residual clause are those
48
“similar” to the enumerated offenses in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). An
49
offense must be “roughly similar,” in both kind and degree of risk.
The Court has also adopted a “purposeful, violent, and aggressive”
conduct test for determining whether an offense qualifies as a violent
50
felony. However, this test is not always necessary in a residual clause
51
analysis. In some cases, the analysis under this test folds into the
“risk” inquiry because offenses that would fall within the class of
“purposeful, violent, and aggressive” conduct would also be “those
52
that present serious potential risks of physical injury to others.” In
these cases, only a risk assessment is required because “risk levels
53
provide a categorical and manageable standard.” In assessing risk,
the question is that formulated in James v. United States, namely a
54
comparison of risk to the closest analog in the enumerated offenses.
Nonetheless, the “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” conduct test
remains appropriate for offenses with a required mental state of less
55
than intentionality.

46. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 202–03 (2007).
47. Id. at 203.
48. The enumerated offenses are burglary, arson, extortion, and the use of explosives. See
18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). See also Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 143–44 (2008)
(rejecting the claim that the word “otherwise” in the residual clause meant that the enumerated
offenses in no way limited the scope of the residual clause).
49. Begay, 553 U.S. at 143–44.
50. See id. at 144–45 (recognizing that the enumerated crimes “all typically involve
purposeful, ‘violent,’ and ‘aggressive’ conduct”). The Court has ruled that an offense which
“amounts to a form of inaction [is] a far cry” from that conduct which would satisfy this test as a
violent felony. Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 128 (2009).
51. See Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2275 (2011) (observing that the phrase from
Begay “‘purposeful, violent, and aggressive’ has no precise textual link to the residual clause”
and is “an addition to the statutory text”).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2275–76.
54. Id. at 2273 (quoting James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 203 (2007)).
55. Id. at 2276. Thus, Sykes did not overrule Begay or Chambers, but merely noted that the
rules from those cases are not necessarily applicable in all cases dealing with the residual clause.

ROBE 3.5.2015 - FINAL READ VERSION (DO NOT DELETE)

112

3/6/2015 12:48 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

[VOL. 10

C. The Circuit Split on “Mere Possession” of Short-barreled Shotguns
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed whether
possession of a short-barreled (or sawed-off) shotgun is a violent
felony under § 924(e), several circuit courts of appeals, employing
56
57
current residual clause jurisprudence, have. The Sixth, Eleventh,
58
and Seventh Circuits have all ruled that possession of a shortbarreled shotgun is not a violent felony under § 924(e). The Fourth
Circuit, in two unpublished opinions, has also answered that question
59
negatively.
The Sixth Circuit has held that mere possession of a sawed-off
shotgun is not a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA because
possession does not “fit well with the more active crimes” listed in §
60
924(e)(ii). The Eleventh Circuit agreed, noting that while both shortbarreled shotguns and explosives are treated equivalently under the
61
National Firearms Act (NFA), the ACCA includes only “use of
explosives” in the enumerated offenses and does not include
62
possession offenses. The Eleventh Circuit therefore held that it
would be incongruous to “classify possessing one type of NFAoutlawed weapon as a violent felony when the ACCA speaks only to
63
the use of another.” The Seventh Circuit also held that mere
possession of a short-barreled shotgun is not a violent felony because
such possession, in terms of the risk, “is not in the same league as the
risks presented by the offenses of burglary, arson, extortion, or crimes
64
involving the use of explosives.” In so holding, the Seventh Circuit
expressly rejected the approach adopted by the Eighth Circuit,
discussed infra, by positing that the “latent risks inherent in . . .
56. United States v. Amos, 501 F.3d 525, 529 (6th Cir. 2007). The Sixth Circuit reached its
decision in Amos prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Begay.
57. United States v. McGill, 618 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2010).
58. United States v. Miller, 721 F.3d 435, 437 (7th Cir. 2013).
59. United States v. Ross, 416 Fed. Appx. 289, 290 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Haste,
292 Fed. Appx. 249, 250 (4th Cir. 2008).
60. Amos, 501 F.3d at 528.
61. National Firearms Act of 1934, June 26, 1934, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236, amended by the
National Firearms Act Amendments of 1968, Pub. L. 90-618, Title II, Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 1227
(codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.A. (West 2014)). Under the NFA, it is a criminal
offense to possess a firearm made or transferred in violation of the NFA, see 26 U.S.C.A. §
5861(b)–(d) (West 2014), punishable by a fine of up to $10,000, a prison term of not more than
ten years, or both, see 28 U.S.C.A. § 5871 (West 2014).
62. McGill, 618 F.3d at 1279.
63. Id.
64. United States v. Miller, 721 F.3d 435, 439–40 (7th Cir. 2013).
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possessing a short-barreled shotgun” do not reach the level of risk
inherent in those enumerated offenses because mere possession of a
firearm requires an “extra step . . . to manifest” the risk of physical
65
injury to another.
66
67
In contrast, the First and Eighth Circuits have held that
possession of a short-barreled shotgun is a violent felony under §
924(e). Underlying the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion was the “inheren[t]
dange[r] and lack [of] usefulness except for violent and criminal
68
purposes” of short-barreled shotguns. The court reasoned that
because short-barreled shotguns have no lawful purpose, possession
of such a firearm “creates a serious potential risk of physical injury to
others” and is thus similar in kind to the enumerated offenses in §
69
924(e). With Johnson, the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed its prior
holdings, noting that the situation at issue here is not materially
different from that in United States v. Lillard, where the court held
that mere possession of a short-barreled shotgun constitutes a violent
70
felony.
D. Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine
It is well-established as a matter of criminal constitutional law that
a penal statute violates due process if it “either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
71
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.”
65. Id. at 443. Miller is therefore consistent with the holding of United States v. Archer, 531
F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 2008) (concealed carry of a weapon is not a violent felony).
66. United States v. Bishop, 453 F.3d 30, 31 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Fortes, 141
F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1998). Both of the First Circuit cases predate the Supreme Court’s decision in
Begay. Interestingly enough, however, the First Circuit initially held, prior to Fortes, that
possession of a firearm by a felon was not a violent felony under the ACCA in an opinion
authored by then-Chief Judge Breyer. See United States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221, 222 (1st Cir.
1992).
67. United States v. Lillard, 685 F.3d 773, 777 (8th Cir. 2012), cert. denied 133 S. Ct. 1242
(2013); United States v. Vincent, 575 F.3d 820, 826–27 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. denied 560 U.S. 927
(2010).
68. Vincent, 575 F.3d at 825 (quoting United States v. Childs, 403 F.3d 970, 971 (8th Cir.
2005)). Similarly, Lillard embraced the conclusion that “[s]hort shotguns are inherently
dangerous because they are not useful” for lawful purposes. Lillard, 658 F.3d at 776.
69. Vincent, 575 F.3d at 825–26. The dissent in Vincent took issue with this conclusion,
stating that “simple possession of a sawed-off shotgun itself does not involve violent and
aggressive conduct in the manner of burglary, arson, extortion, or criminal use of explosives”
and to hold otherwise “risks expanding the ACCA’s residual clause to include any crime that
has a hypothetical connection to violence.” Id. 575 F.3d at 831 (Gruender, J., dissenting).
70. United States v. Johnson, 526 Fed. Appx. 708, 711 (8th Cir. 2013).
71. Connelly v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). This principle, commonly
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The rationale for this rule is two-fold: it ensures that the public is
provided with actual notice as to what conduct is criminally
proscribed and it prevents arbitrary enforcement of the criminal
72
laws. Under this doctrine, the analysis goes “not [to] the possibility
that it will sometimes be difficult to determine whether the
incriminating fact it establishes has been proved . . . but rather [to] the
73
indeterminacy of precisely what that fact is.” A criminal statute fails
the notice purpose when it fails to delineate unlawful criminal
conduct from lawful acts or does not provide objective criteria for
74
making such a determination. A criminal statute fails the nonarbitrary enforcement purpose if it “vests virtually complete
discretion” in law enforcement for deciding if a criminal suspect has
75
engaged in criminal behavior.
A facial challenge that a law is unconstitutionally vague must
allege that all applications of that law are invalid; and a court will
uphold such a challenge if the law “reaches a substantial amount of
76
constitutionally protected conduct.” However, a court ruling on a
vagueness challenge must first determine whether there is a
77
reasonable saving construction of the statutory language. In as
applied challenges, however, because the standard of certainty for
criminal statutes is relatively high, such a law may fail on vagueness
grounds even if it is possible there may be some valid application of
78
the law.

referred to as “void-for-vagueness” doctrine, is not without its critics. A popular criminal law
casebook, with all the irony it can muster, notes that “[t]he case law that determines when
statutes are too vague is itself exceedingly vague.” KADISH ET AL., supra note 1 at 185. Cf.
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 524 (1948) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting) (“[I]ndefiniteness’ is
not a quantitative concept. . . . It is itself an indefinite concept.”); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr.,
Legality, Vagueness and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 196 (1985) (“The
difficulty is that there is no yardstick of impermissible indeterminacy.”).
72. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983). Of these two purposes, the prevention
of arbitrary enforcement predominates. See id.
73. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 306 (2008).
74. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 149 (2007).
75. Kolendar, 461 U.S. at 358.
76. Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982).
77. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 405 (2010) (citations omitted).
78. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 n.8.
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III. ARGUMENTS
A. Johnson’s Arguments
Johnson first argues that mere possession of a short-barreled
shotgun cannot constitute a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA
because mere possession differs in kind from the enumerated offenses
79
listed in § 924(e)(ii). He contends that possession of a short-barreled
shotgun is a strict-liability offense under Minnesota law involving no
80
purposeful, violent or aggressive conduct. Additionally, possession is
not even illegal in a majority of states whereas the enumerated
81
offenses listed in the ACCA are universally regarded as unlawful.
Johnson notes that under the Court’s existing jurisprudence, it is
imperative to read the residual clause in conjunction with the
enumerated offenses. Ignoring those offenses would lead to an
inclusion of additional predicate offenses too dissimilar to the
82
enumerated offenses to justify their classification as violent felonies.
Johnson argues that the purpose of the ACCA was designed to
create national uniformity with respect to sentence enhancement for
83
violent criminals. As the Court has previously noted, the legislative
intent behind the ACCA was to “supplement the States’ law
84
enforcement efforts against ‘career’ criminals.” Within this
overarching goal, Congress sought to focus only upon the most
85
serious offenses and to ignore other, lesser offenses.
Next, Johnson argues that, under the various tests put forth in the
residual clause jurisprudence, mere possession of a short-barreled
86
87
shotgun cannot be a violent felony. Under the “similar in kind” test,
Johnson argues that such a possession offense is markedly different
79. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 16.
80. Id. at 7.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 15 (quoting Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 141–42 (2008)).
83. Id. at 11; cf. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 590 (1990) (stating that there is no
“indication that Congress ever abandoned its general approach, in designating predicate
offenses, of using uniform, categorical definitions to capture all offenses of a certain level of
seriousness . . . regardless of technical definitions and labels under state law”).
84. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 581.
85. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 12. According to Johnson, it makes sense that the
legislative history does not suggest legislative intent to include mere possession of either
explosives or firearms in the predicate offenses for purposes of sentence enhancement. See id. at
13.
86. Id. at 15.
87. See Begay, 553 U.S. at 143.
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from the enumerated offenses in that it is an offense merely of
88
possession and requires no proof of additional elements. Possession
is “passive,” unlike the enumerated offenses which “all involve active
89
felonies.” A focus on the minimum conduct required for an offense
necessitates that the appropriate comparative analysis is between the
enumerated offenses and only the “basic passive elements of mere
90
possession . . . and not some imagined use.” This is of particular
salience in cases dealing with possession of a weapon, Johnson argues,
because in many cases, the weapon is never exposed to another
91
person.
Simply put, “mere possession of a weapon doesn’t have to involve
any risk,” whereas those activities involving a weapon that “go
92
beyond . . . mere possession” have a high level of risk. Furthermore,
Johnson argues, possession of a short-barreled shotgun is widely legal
under state law and is, subject to registration, allowed under federal
law as well; in contrast, enumerated offenses are universally
93
proscribed. In only a small minority of states, Johnson asserts, is
94
possession of short-barreled shotguns prohibited outright.
As to whether a mere possession offense meets Begay’s
“purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test, Johnson argues that
“additional steps are required to convert simple possession into an act
95
that uses violence.” Thus, in a case dealing with mere possession, the
“purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test is not subsumed into the risk
96
analysis.
Johnson further argues that the closest analog, among the
enumerated offenses, to mere possession of a short-barreled shotgun
is the use of explosives; although the former only entails passive
possession, the latter “necessarily entails an active employment of a

88. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 19. As the Court held in Taylor, the focus of an
ACCA analysis is on the “elements of the statute of conviction, not to the facts of each
defendant’s conduct.” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601.
89. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 20, 22.
90. Id. at 20.
91. Id. at 21 (quoting United States v. Miller, 721 F.3d 435, 439 (7th Cir. 2013)).
92. Miller, 721 F.3d at 440.
93. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 25–26 (noting that the National Firearms Act
does not outright proscribe possession of short-barreled shotguns, though it does provide for
strict regulation of such firearms).
94. Id. at 28.
95. Id. at 29.
96. Id. at 30.
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97

dangerous item.” The risk entailed with mere possession, Johnson
argues, is relatively low because there is no requirement for use of the
firearm, particularly given that, under the right circumstances,
possession is lawful and available statistics do not show mere
98
possession to be more risky.
B. The Government’s Arguments
The Government begins by arguing that this case is properly
framed as dealing with illegal possession of a short-barreled shotgun,
99
not mere possession more generally. Viewing the question in this
manner, the Government argues, makes it clear that such possession
constitutes a violent felony under the ACCA because it presents a
100
heightened risk of serious physical injury to another person. A
person who unlawfully possesses a short-barreled shotgun is one who
101
is “likely to engage in serious, dangerous crimes with the weapon,”
and possession of such a weapon during the commission of a serious
102
crime increases the risk of serious physical harm.
To buttress this argument, the Government argues that the
ordinary case of possession of a short-barreled shotgun is in
103
connection with the commission of serious crime, in part relying
104
upon dicta in District of Columbia v. Heller, which implied that
possession of a short-barreled shotgun is typically dissociated from
law-abiding behavior. The Government notes that while all shotguns,
regardless of the length of the barrel, can cause “catastrophic injury,”
the particular danger inherent with a short-barrel shotgun is
especially acute because such a weapon is easily concealed and
105
“maneuver[able] in tight confines.”
Shotguns with short or
shortened barrels, the Government claims, are not designed for lawful
106
uses such as self-defense or hunting or skeet shooting. Instead,

97. Id. at 39.
98. Id. at 37, 39.
99. Brief for Respondent at 15, Johnson v. United States, No. 13-7120 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2014)
[hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
100. Id. at 17.
101. Id. at 18.
102. Id. at 31.
103. Id. at 18.
104. 554 U.S. 570, 625 (2008) (explicitly excluding short-barreled shotguns from those
firearms “typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes”).
105. Brief for Respondent, supra note 99, at 18–19.
106. Id. at 20 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 624–25; United States v. Upton, 512 F.3d 394, 404
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short-barreled shotguns are in the same “quasi-suspect” class as
107
because they are designed for
grenades or machineguns,
108
“indiscriminate murder, maiming, and intimidation.” As such, the
Government embraces the Eighth Circuit’s prior holdings that such
weapons present an “inherent[] danger[] and lack usefulness except
109
for violent and criminal purposes.”
To rebut Johnson’s claim that possession of a short-barreled
shotgun is lawful in some circumstances and thus cannot be a violent
110
felony, the Government contends that the ordinary state-law case of
unlawful possession is highly unlikely to involve a possessor who
abides with federal firearms regulations; therefore, for analysis of the
ordinary case, lawful possession of short-barreled shotguns must be
111
ignored.
The Government cites empirical evidence supporting the view
112
that “short-barreled shotguns are primarily weapons of crime.”
Although admitting Johnson may be correct that, statistically,
handguns are used in more crimes than short-barreled shotguns, the
Government contends that the comparison is inapt principally
because it has long been recognized that handguns have a lawful use,
113
whereas short-barreled shotguns do not.
In this respect, the
Government emphasizes that cases of unlawful possession of shortbarreled shotguns indicate that the “typical offender . . . [is] a violent
(7th Cir. 2008)).
107. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 611–12 (1994).
108. Brief for Respondent, supra note 99, at 21 (also noting that a “substantial number” of
the cases of lawful possession of short-barreled shotguns are due to use in law enforcement or
military contexts).
109. Id. at 20 (quoting United States v. Vincent, 575 F.3d 820, 825 (8th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). The Government also argues that other legislation, such as the
National Firearms Act, demonstrates a longstanding view of Congres that short-barreled
shotguns have no inherent lawful use for private citizens. Id. at 22. In particular, the
Government notes that it was precisely this concern that underpinned the Minnesota statute
prohibiting possession of a short-barreled shotgun under which Johnson was convicted. Id. at 24
(quoting State v. Ellenberger, 543 N.W.2d 673, 676 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996)).
110. See supra Part IV.A.
111. Brief for Respondent, supra note 99, at 25. Relying upon the dicta of Heller, the
Government concludes that it is incontrovertible that “short-barreled shotguns possessed
unlawfully are typically possessed in connection with other unlawful activity.” Id. Further, as the
Government sees it, the regulatory regime set up by Congress for allowing possession of
registered short-barreled shotguns merely provides a way to minimize the risk of criminal use of
a short-barreled shotgun rather than demonstrating that possession of short-barreled shotguns is
not inherently dangerous. Id. at 28.
112. Id. at 22.
113. Id. at 29.
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felon” who intends to use the weapon in a violent crime.
Compounding this with the fact that such firearms are extremely
powerful, easily concealed, and easy to control, possession of shortbarreled shotguns dramatically increases the risk of physical injury to
115
others. Short-barreled shotguns thus pose a “unique danger,”
evidenced by their use in many of high-profile crimes of mass
116
violence.
The Government argues that possession of a short-barreled
shotgun presents risks similar in kind as those presented by the
enumerated offenses of § 924(e) because such possession evinces “a
117
lack of concern for the safety of others,” increases the danger of
118
violence, and “conveys an implicit threat of violence.” These risks
are apparent in the ordinary case of illegal possession, which, given
119
James v. United States, confines the range of analysis for determining
120
whether such conviction is a violent felony.
The Government also takes issue with the contention that a
categorical approach to § 924(e) necessarily excludes possessory
offenses from the ambit of violent felonies; the Government instead
argues that the “principal thrust” of the residual clause analysis asks
121
what additional conduct may occur simultaneous to the offense.
Thus, the Government rejects the contention that the “least of the
122
Further, the
acts” analysis applies to the residual clause.
Government argues that possession of a short-barreled shotgun is
similar in risk to the use of explosives because the former is
inherently dangerous and because possession of explosives can be
123
legal even though the use of them may not.
Finally, the Government notes that, under applicable Minnesota
precedent, illegal possession of a short-barreled shotgun is not a strict
124
liability offense. Rather, the Minnesota statute requires a defendant
114. Id. at 31.
115. Id. at 32–34.
116. Id. at 34.
117. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2269 (2011).
118. Brief for Respondent, supra note 99, at 39.
119. 550 U.S. 192 (2007).
120. See id. at 39–40 (quoting James, 550 U.S. at 204).
121. Id. at 43.
122. See id. at 44 (citing James, 550 U.S. at 207–09, for the proposition that an inquiry into
risk turns on the ordinary case of the commission of the offense).
123. Id. at 47–48.
124. See id. at 49–50 (explaining that the “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test only
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to “knowingly possess[]” a weapon to be convicted; thus, there is no
need, under Sykes v. United States, to determine whether or not mere
126
possession includes purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct. The
Government concludes that one who engages in the act of arming
oneself with a short-barreled shotgun is engaged in the same sort of
dangerous behavior as one who commits one of the enumerated
127
offenses.
IV. ANALYSIS: DETERMINING THE PROPER SCOPE OF “VIOLENT
FELONY”
Central to the question of the scope of violent felony is the
128
meaning of the term “conduct.” Statutory construction begins with
application of the “ordinary meaning” canon: where statutory
language is unambiguous, that language should be interpreted
according to the words themselves unless such application leads to
129
absurd results. The term “conduct” means the “action or manner of
conducting, directing, managing, or carrying on (any business,
130
performance, process, course, etc.); direction, management.” In
131
contrast, “possession,” or the “exercise of dominion or control,” has
been defined by the Supreme Court to include both actual possession
132
and constructive possession. While a showing of actual possession

applies to offenses which do not require a mens rea element).
125. Id. at 50–51 (quoting State v. Salyers, 842 N.W.2d 28, 34–35 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014)).
126. See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2275–76.
127. Brief for Respondent, supra note 99, at 53–54.
128. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (West 2014) (“‘violent felony’ means any crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . [which] involves conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another person” (emphasis added)).
129. E.g., United States v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929). Two
commentators refer to the ordinary-meaning rule as the “most fundamental semantic rule of
interpretation.” ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARDNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 69 (2012).
130. 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 690 (2d ed. 1989); cf. WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 274 (1988) (defining conduct as “the act, manner, or process of
carrying on” or the “mode or standard of personal behavior”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 336
(9th ed. 2009) (stating that conduct is “[p]ersonal behavior, whether by action or inaction; the
manner in which a person behaves”). This meaning has persisted for a considerable time. See 1
NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 44 (1828) (defining
the term as “personal behavior; course of actions” and noting that, at the time, conduct, by
itself, denoted the “idea of behavior or course of life or manners”).
131. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 130, at 1281.
132. See Nat’l Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58, 67 (1914) (noting that “both in
common speech and in legal terminology, there is no word more ambiguous in its meaning than
possession” because the term “is interchangeably used to describe actual possession and
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may necessitate proof of some sort of “directing, managing, or
carrying on,” constructive possession, as a legal construct, requires no
133
This is particularly true for the
demonstration of conduct.
Minnesota statute Johnson was convicted under: there was no
requirement that actual, physical custody of the shotgun be
134
demonstrated to convict. In fact, as the Eighth Circuit below noted,
the factual record here is not distinguishable from that in United
States v. Lillard, which dealt with a conviction under a Nebraska
135
statute prohibiting constructive possession of a “short shotgun.”
Thus, under the ordinary meaning of the term, constructive
possession would not fall within the scope of “conduct” because it
does not entail any “action or manner of . . . directing, managing or
136
carrying on.” The Court’s prior rulings on the residual clause in no
way distract from the plain meaning of the clause because those cases
137
dealt only with offenses involving conduct.
constructive possession which often so shade into one another that it is difficult to say where
one ends and the other begins”).
133. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 130, at 1282 (defining constructive
possession as “[c]ontrol or dominion over a property without actual possession or custody”); see
also 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 45 (2006) (stating that constructive possession is knowledge of the
object possessed along with an “ability to maintain control over it or reduce it to . . . physical
possession”) (citation omitted); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 224 (2d
ed. 2010) (stating that constructive possession is “often described in terms of dominion and
control” or even more generally used to describe “circumstances in which the defendant had the
ability to reduce an object to his control”); WILLIAM L. CLARK JR., HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL
LAW 323–24 (William E. Mickell, ed., 3d ed. West Publishing Co. 1915) (differentiating actual
from constructive possession). This is the definition courts have adopted for constructive
possession in the context of criminal law. See, e.g., Aqua Log, Inc. v. Georgia, 594 F.3d 1330,
1336–37 (11th Cir. 2010).
134. See generally MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.67(2) (West 2014).
135. United States v. Lillard, 685 F.3d 773, 776 n.3 (8th Cir. 2012).
136. Interestingly enough, Johnson does not flesh out this plain meaning argument, though
he does reference the “plain meaning of the term ‘violent felony.’” Brief for Petitioner, supra
note 18, at 42. The plain meaning of the term “conduct” plays a central role in one of the amici
arguments, however. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Gun Owners of America, Inc. et al. at 7–9,
Johnson v. United States, No. 13-7120 (U.S. Jul. 3, 2014) (arguing that Johnson’s conviction was
based upon constructive possession, not requiring showing of actual custody, and thus not based
upon any proof of conduct on part of Johnson) [hereinafter Brief Amicus Curiae of Gun
Owners of America]. The Government addressed this argument, arguing that the meaning of
conduct must encompass both actual and constructive possession because “[p]ossession requires
action to exercise dominion over an object, either actually or constructively, such as by
exercising exclusive control over the area where the object is located.” Brief for Respondent,
supra note 99, at 46 n.21 (citing State v. Denison, 607 N.W.2d 796, 799–800 (Minn. Ct. App.
2000)).
137. See Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011) (vehicular flight); Chambers v.
United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009) (fleeing officer); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008)
(DUI); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 192 (2007) (attempted burglary). Because all of
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Of course, statutory interpretation does not end with the plain
meaning divorced from context; rather, in determining the meaning of
statutory language, the Court must examine not only the particular
language at issue but also the “language and design of the statute as a
138
whole.” Tellingly, one of the enumerated offenses, the use of
139
explosives, expressly limits its scope to use, not to possession. The
fact that only use of explosives is included in the definition of violent
felony forecloses the possibility that mere possession of explosives
140
would also meet that definition. By extension, therefore, it would be
illogical to view the statutory language of the residual clause as
including as a violent felony constructive possession of a shortbarreled shotgun when, arguably, explosives are inherently more
dangerous than a firearm. This is so because the latter normally
requires some additional action to create a risk of physical harm while
the former does not.
Further, as one appellate court has reasoned, all of the
enumerated offenses “manifest affirmative, overt and active conduct”
with respect to the serious risk of potential physical harm they
141
present to another “beyond the mere possession of a weapon.” The
Court’s residual clause jurisprudence bears this point out. As the
Court ruled in Begay v. United States, all four of the enumerated
offenses “typically involve purposeful, ‘violent,’ and ‘aggressive’
142
conduct.” Therefore, the Court’s precedent supports the conclusion
that, read contextually, the residual clause does not encompass
offenses of mere possession because these offenses lack an element
143
requiring an “act, manner, or process of carrying on.”

these cases dealt with conduct, the Court’s approach in Sykes, focusing on the risk analysis, does
not do away with the statutory requirement that, for a predicate offense to constitute a violent
felony under the ACCA, it must involve conduct.
138. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (citations omitted); cf. United
Savings Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs, Ltd, 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988)
(“Statutory construction . . . is a holistic endeavor.”). This rule is sometimes referred to as the
“whole-text” canon.
139. See 18 U.S.C.A § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (West 2014).
140. This is precisely the reasoning adopted by the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Flores,
477 F.3d 431, 436 (6th Cir. 2007).
141. United States v. Oliver, 20 F.3d 415, 418 (11th Cir. 1994).
142. Begay, 553 U.S. at 144–45; see also Chambers, 555 U.S. at 128 (stating that a “crime
amount[ing] to a form of inaction [is] a far cry from the “purposeful, ‘violent,’ and ‘aggressive’
conduct potentially at issue” with respect to the enumerated offenses) (citation omitted).
143. WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 274 (1988).
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This construction of the statute is reinforced by application of the
rule against superfluous construction, a canon holding that “a statute
should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions”
144
rendering “no part [to] be inoperative or superfluous.” Application
of this canon suggests that mere possession could not be within the
confines of § 924(e). A contrary reading would render the term “use”
superfluous in the phrase “use of explosives,” one of the enumerated
145
offenses. The fact that the residual clause hinges on the phrase
“involves conduct,” by negative implication, would foreclose offenses
not based on conduct from falling within the purview of the residual
clause. Furthermore, the Government all but concedes that the
residual clause cannot encompass mere possession offenses when it
acknowledges that “the elements required to complete the offense of
possession of a short-barreled shotgun do not necessitate a risk of
146
physical injury.”
In terms of the risk analysis performed under the residual clause,
comparison should be made between the offense at issue and its
147
closest analog among the enumerated offenses. While the use of
explosives is undeniably risky, the mere possession of a short-barreled
148
shotgun is “not in the same league.” Though statistics can be useful
in informing the Court’s analysis of the residual clause, they are by no

144. Clark v. Rameker, 134 S. Ct. 2242, 2248 (2014) (quoting Corley v. United States, 556
U.S. 303, 314 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Some refer to this rule of statutory
construction as the “surplusage canon.” See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 129, at 174 (stating
“[i]f possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect”).
145. Such reasoning follows the Court’s analysis of neighboring provisions of the ACCA, in
which the Court construed “use” of a firearm as “requir[ing] evidence sufficient to show an
active employment of the firearm” and that, therefore, the term “must connote more than mere
possession.” Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 143 (1995), superseded by statute, An Act to
throttle criminal use of guns, Pub. L. 105–386, 112 Stat. 3469, as recognized in Abbott v. United
States, 562 U.S. 8 (2010). The fact that Congress responded to Bailey by amending 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 924(c) to include mere possession is proof Congress understands that if it intends to regulate
the possession of firearms under the ACCA, it must incorporate explicit language to that effect.
Because Congress included possession of a firearm in § 924(c) but continues not to do so in §
924(e) is further evidence that § 924(e) does not cover possession offenses.
146. Brief for Respondent, supra note 99, at 43.
147. E.g., Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2273 (2011) (comparing vehicular flight to
the enumerated offense of burglary because both crimes may lead to violent confrontation).
148. United States v. Miller, 721 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 2013). As amici Gun Owners et al.
perceptively, yet drolly, point out, “[a] short-barreled shotgun sitting in the corner is not
inherently more dangerous than a short-barreled shotgun sitting in the corner with an ATF tax
stamp lying next to it.” Brief Amicus Curiae of Gun Owners of America, supra note 136, at 15
n.8.
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means “dispositive.” Given the fundamental difference between
“use” and “mere possession,” it follows that “possess[ion of] one type
of [National Firearms Act] outlawed weapon” cannot constitute a
150
violent felony.
If the Court is concerned about construing the residual clause too
narrowly, it should restrict its holding to constructive possession and
leave for another day a decision on whether certain cases of actual
possession fall within the scope of conduct offenses which satisfy the
requirements of the residual clause. This holding would be consistent
with the prior Supreme Court decisions requiring the scope of the
residual clause to be informed by the enumerated offenses, all of
which the Court has characterized as “conduct,” an element lacking
151
from the concept of constructive possession.
Because this
interpretation derives from the correct construction of the statutory
text, the Court ought to hold that an offense requiring nothing more
than constructive possession does not constitute a violent felony
under the residual clause of the ACCA.
Finally, a holding focused upon the plain meaning of the statutory
language would allow the Court to resolve the case in such a way as to
avoid the constitutional question of whether the ACCA is
152
impermissibly vague. Interpreting the ACCA in light of the plain
meaning of the term “conduct” would not result in an indefinite
criminal prohibition because courts would only engage in complex,
comparative risk analysis under the ACCA only if the predicate
offense first involved conduct. Any non-conduct based offenses would
necessarily be excluded as predicate offenses under the § 924(e)
residual clause.

149. Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2274.
150. United States v. McGill, 618 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 2010).
151. See Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 127–28 (2009) (declaring that inaction
does not amount to “conduct,” because it lacks “as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of another” (quoting 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (West 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
152. Under the rule of constitutional avoidance, in its modern form, a court must not
resolve a case on constitutional grounds if it can decide the case as a matter of statutory
construction. E.g., Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343
(1999) (quoting Spector Motor Serv. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944)). The Court has
described the operation of this rule as “a tool for choosing between competing plausible
interpretations of a statutory text, resting on the reasonable presumption that Congress did not
intend the alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts.” Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S.
371, 381 (2005) (citations omitted).
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Engaging in this saving construction would serve both ends of the
void-for-vagueness doctrine. It would provide the public with actual
notice that only those offenses involving conduct fall within the
purview of the statute and prevent arbitrary enforcement as police,
prosecutors, and juries would otherwise continue to struggle with
determining which non-conduct offenses count under the ACCA,
potentially making such determinations based merely upon “their
153
[own] personal predilections.”
Further, an avoidance of the
constitutional question would allow the Court to keep its existing §
924(e) residual clause jurisprudence intact precisely because all of the
Court’s prior decisions are consistent with the plain meaning of the
154
term conduct. On the other hand, a holding that the ACCA is
unconstitutionally vague would necessitate the Court over-ruling all
of its prior § 924(e) residual clause jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
Parsing an ambiguous statutory provision can be difficult and
requires the Court to tread delicately. However, a careful textual
analysis indicates that the correct answer to the question of whether
mere possession of a short-barreled shotgun is a violent felony under
the ACCA is not an insurmountable challenge under the Court’s
residual clause jurisprudence. Indeed, both the ordinary meaning of
the term “conduct” and the context surrounding the residual clause
indicate that possession offenses and, in particular, constructive
possession offenses, fall outside of the scope of that clause. Because
existing residual clause jurisprudence has focused upon deciding
which conduct offenses fall within the reach of § 924(e)—by
implication mere possession offenses are outside the scope of the
residual clause. Put differently, a holding that mere possession
offenses are not covered by the residual clause is not only consistent
with prior cases but is actually favored by precedent. Such a holding

153. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974).
154. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. This appears to be the approach Justice
Scalia has long advocated, though without success in securing a majority on the Court. For
instance, he has declared his preference for an approach to the residual clause which “figure[s]
out a coherent way of interpreting the statute so that it applies in a relatively predictable and
administrable fashion” as including a relatively small subset of crimes rather than strike down
the law on vagueness grounds. James v. United States, 550 US. 197, 230 (2007) (Scalia, J.
dissenting). Justice Scalia reaffirmed his position four years later. See Sykes v. United States,
131 S. Ct. 2267, 2287 (2011) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
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would allow the Court to follow the rule of constitutional avoidance
and resolve the case based solely upon matters of statutory
interpretation without reaching any constitutional question.

